Differential privacy has steadily become the de-facto standard for achieving strong privacy guarantees in data analysis. It is typically implemented either in the "central" or "local" model. In the former, a trusted centralized server collects the records in the clear from the data owners and outputs differentially private statistics; while in the latter, the data owners individually randomize their inputs to ensure differential privacy. The local model has been popular as it dispenses with the need for a trusted data collector. This increased security in the local model, however, comes at the cost of strictly lower accuracy and restricted algorithmic expressibility for differentially private programs compared to the central model.
Introduction
There is a growing need for releasing aggregate properties from sensitive datasets in several domains including social science, healthcare, and advertising. Differentially private algorithms [26] , whose outputs are insensitive to adding or removing a single row in the input dataset, have arisen as the gold standard for these situations. Differential privacy provides a provable and persuasive guarantee of privacy to individuals in a dataset, and has seen adoption by government [53, 69] and commercial organizations [30, 37, 58] . It is defined with respect to a privacy parameter > 0 where lower the value of , greater is the privacy guaranteed.
Differential privacy (DP) is typically implemented in one of two models -centralized differential privacy, or CDP, and local differential privacy, or LDP. In CDP, data from individuals are collected and stored in the clear in a trusted centralized data curator. The trusted curator executes DP programs on the sensitive data and releases outputs to a mistrustful data analyst. A canonical algorithm in CDP is the Laplace mechanism where the curator releases the output of a function f by adding noise drawn from the Laplace distribution to hide the presence or absence of one row in the input database.
In LDP, there is no trusted centralized data curator. Rather, each individual perturbs their own data using a (local) differentially private algorithm. The data analyst has direct access to these perturbed data, and uses it to infer aggregate statistics of the datasets. A canonical LDP algorithm is the randomized response mechanism [73] where each data owner flips some of his/her input bits based on a coin toss to provide plausible deniability [26] .
Recent deployments of DP in commercial organizations [30, 37] have preferred LDP over CDP. CDP's assumption of a trusted server that stores data in the clear is ill-suited for many applications as it constitutes a single point of failure for data breaches, and saddles the trusted curator with legal and ethical obligations to keep the user data secure. For instance, Google Chrome uses the LDP model rather than CDP to detect changes in browser properties of its userbase as it does not want the legal burden of storing highly sensitive browser fingerprints in the clear on its servers [30] .
However, LDP's attractive security properties come with a utilitarian price tag. All DP algorithms ensure privacy by introducing noise into the computation. Under the CDP model, one can release an aggregate count over the dataset having n rows with an expected additive error of at most Θ(1/ ) and ensure -DP (e.g., using the Laplace mechanism [26] ). In contrast, under the LDP model, at least Ω( √ n/ ) additive error in expectation must be incurred by any -DP program for this task [11, 17, 25] , owing to the individual coin tosses of each data owner [12, 30, 31, 70] . Thus, on a dataset with a billion individuals, properties that are common to a population as large as 30,000 individuals can be missed under LDP.
The LDP model imposes additional penalties in terms of the algorithmic expressibility. Kasiviswanathan et al. in [44] showed that the power of LDP is equivalent to that of the statistical query model [46] from learning theory and there exists an exponential separation between the accuracy and sample complexity of local and centralized DP algorithms. As a consequence, LDP requires enormous amounts of data to obtain reliable population statistics. Unsurprisingly, only large corporations like Google [30, 31, 12] and Apple [37] have attempted deploying LDP.
In this paper, we strive to bridge the gap between LDP and CDP. We propose, Outis, a new model for differential privacy that:
• never stores or computes on sensitive data in the clear, and still
• achieves the accuracy guarantees and algorithmic expressibility of the CDP model.
In Outis a single trusted data curator is replaced by a pair of untrusted but non-colluding servers -the Analytics Server (AS) and the Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP). The AS plays the role of data curator in CDP in executing the differentially private programs, but on encrypted data records. The CSP initializes and manages the cryptographic primitives, and collaborates with the AS when the DP program needs to generate outputs. Under the assumption that the AS and the CSP are semi-honest and do not collude (a common assumption in the cryptography-assisted computation literature [60, 59, 33, 48, 56, 34, 32] ), Outis is designed to reveal no extra information beyond what can be learned by the release of the outputs of a differentially private program. This is achieved using cryptographic primitives like linear homomorphic encryption and Yao's garbled circuits.
to the sensitive data via data transformations operators (inspired by relational algebra) and differentially private measurement operators ( Laplace mechanism and Noisy-Max [26] ). Programs can have constructs like looping and conditionals, and can arbitrarily post-process outputs of measurement operators. Such logical programs have been shown to express state-of-the art DP algorithms under the CDP model. Outis compiles these logical programs into Outis protocols that can work on the encrypted data on the AS and CSP.
The main contributions of this work are • New Approach: We present the design and implementation of Outis, a novel system for executing DP programs over encrypted data on two non-colluding untrusted servers.
• Algorithm Expressibility: Outis supports data analysis via a rich class of state-of -the-art differentially private programs expressed in terms of a small set of transformation and measurement operators. Thus, Outis achieves the accuracy guarantees of the CDP model without the need for a trusted curator.
• Performance Optimizations: Existing techniques to compile logical Outis programs into cryptographic protocols often result in inefficient programs. We present optimizations that speed up computation on encrypted data by at least an order of magnitude. A novel contribution of this work are DP indexing optimizations that leverage on the fact that differentially private programs can reveal statistical information about the data.
• Practical for Real World Usage: We demonstrate the accuracy and practical efficiency of Outis via extensive evaluation. For the same tasks, Outis programs achieve accuracy comparable to CDP and orders of magnitude (at least 2) more accuracy than that of LDP. Moreover, Outis is efficient and runs within 5 min for a large class of programs on a dataset with 32,561 rows and 4 attributes.
• Generalized Multiplication Using Linear Homomorphic encryption: Our implementations leverages on an efficient method of performing n-way multiplications using linear homomorphic encryptions, which maybe of independent interest.
Organization: We introduce differential privacy and the cryptographic primitives used in Outis in Section 2.
We present the system overview in Section 3. Outis primitives and their implementation are outlined in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Outis optimizations are described in Section 6. Outis is empirically evaluated in Section 8. Related work and conclusions are discussed in Sections 9 and 10, respectively.
Background
In this section we give a brief introduction to definitions and primitives relevant to Outis.
Differential Privacy
Definition 1. An algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy ( -DP), where > 0 is a privacy parameter, iff for any two datasets D and D that differ in a single record, we have
where Range(A) denotes the set of all possible outputs A.
When applied multiple times, the differential privacy guarantee degrades gracefully as follows.
Theorem 1. (Sequential Composition) If A 1 and A 2 are 1 -DP and 2 -DP algorithms that use independent randomness, then releasing the outputs A 1 (D) and A 2 (D) on database D satisfies 1 + 2 -DP.
Another important result for differential privacy is that any post-processing computation performed on the noisy output of a differentially private algorithm does not cause any loss in privacy.
Theorem 2. (Post-Processing) Let A : D → R be a randomized algorithm that is -DP. Let f : R → R be an arbitrary randomized mapping. Then f • A : D → R is -DP.
We also define the stability of a data transformation operation. Definition 2. A transformation T is defined to be t-stable if for two datasets D and D , we have
where
Transformations with bounded stability scale the differential privacy guarantee of their outputs, by their stability constant [54] .
Theorem 3. Given T be an arbitrary t-stable transformation on dataset D and an -DP algorithm A which takes output of T as input, the composite computation A • T provides ( · t)-DP.
Cryptographic Primitives
Linearly Homomorphic Encryption (LHE). Let (M, +) be a finite group. A LHE scheme for messages in M is defined as • Key Generation (Gen) -This algorithm takes the security parameter κ as input and outputs a pair of secret and public keys, (s k , p k ) ← Gen(κ).
• Encryption (Enc) -This is a randomized algorithm that encrypts a message m ∈ M via the public key p k , to generate ciphertext c ← Enc pk (m).
• Decryption (Dec) -This is a deterministic function that uses the secret key s k to recover the plaintext m from ciphertext c. In addition, LHE supports the operator ⊕ that allows the summation of ciphers as follows: Let c 1 ← Enc pk (m1), . . . , c a ← Enc pk (m a ), a ∈ Z >0 . Then we have Dec sk (c 1 ⊕ c 2 ... ⊕ c a ) = m 1 + . . . + m a . One can multiply a cipher c ← Enc sk (m) by a plaintext positive integer a by a repetitions of ⊕. We denote this operation by cM ult(a, c) such that Dec sk cM ult(a, c) = a · m.
Labeled Homomorphic Encryption(labHE). Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an LHE scheme with security parameter κ and message space M. Assume that a multiplication operation is given in M, i.e., is a finite ring. Let also F : {0, 1} s × L → M be a pseudo-random function with seed space {0, 1} s ( s= poly(κ)) and the label space L. A labHE scheme is defined as • labGen(κ) -On input κ, it runs Gen(κ) and outputs (sk, pk)
• localGen(pk) -For each user i and with the public key as input, it samples a random seed σ i ∈ {0, 1} s and computes pk i = Enc pk (σ i ) where σ i is an encoding of σ i as an element of M. It outputs (σ i , pk i ).
• labEnc pk (σ i , m, τ ): On input a message m ∈ M with label τ ∈ L from user i, it computes b = F(σ i , τ ) (known as the mask) and outputs the labeled ciphertext c = (a, d) ∈ M × C with a = m − b (known as the hidden message) in M and d = Enc pk (b). For brevity we just use notation labEnc pk (m) to denote the above functionality, in the rest of paper.
• labDec sk (c) -This functions inputs a cipher c = (a, d) ∈ M × C encrypted under labHE and decrypts it as m = a − Dec sk (d).
Both LHE and labHE provides semantic security guarantee [45] .
Secure Computation. Garbled circuit, also known as Yao's protocol [77, 51] , is a generic method for secure computation. Two data owners with respective private inputs x 1 and x 2 run the protocol such that, no party learns more than what is revealed from the output value f (x 1 , x 2 ) for a function f . One of the data owners, called generator, builds a "garbled" version of a circuit computing f and sends it over to the other data owner, called evaluator, alongside the garbled input values for x 1 . Upon receiving the circuit, the evaluator engages in an oblivious transfer protocol with the generator to obliviously obtain the garbled input for x 2 and subsequently computes the output f (x 1 , x 2 ).
Outis Overview
In this section, we describe the architecture of Outis (Section 3.1), the different modules in the system (Section 3.2), and the trust assumptions made by our system (Section 3.3). We end with a brief discussion justifying the design of Outis (Section 3.4). The key notations used in this paper are summarized in 
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System Architecture
The architecture of Outis is illustrated in Figure 1 . A set of data owners
. Outis permits data analysts to author and execute programs P that satisfy differential privacy under the CDP model without storing or computing on the private data records in the clear. Outis achieves this by aggregating encrypted private records at the Analytics Server (AS). Keys needed for encrypting private records and decrypting answers are managed by the Cryptographic Servide Provider (CSP) so that the data owner need not participate in the differentially private computation.
Outis operates in three phases: • Setup Phase: In the first phase, data owners initializes the CSP with a privacy budget B , which is stored in the CSP's Privacy Engine module. Next, the CSP's Key Manager module generates the key pairs for labHE (sk, pk), publishes pk and stores sk.
• Data Collection Phase: In the next phase, each data owner encodes and encrypts their records using the Data Encoder and Data Encryption modules and sends the encrypted data records to the AS. The data owners are relieved of all other duties and can go completely off-line. The aggregator module of the AS then aggregates these encrypted records into a single encrypted databaseD.
• Program Execution Phase: In this phase, the AS executes a Outis program provided by the data analyst. Outis programs (which are described in more detail in Sections 4 and 5) access the sensitive data using a restricted set of data transformations, that filter, count or group the sensitive data, and measurement primitives, which are differentially private operations to release noisy answers. A majority of the data transformation operations are executed wholly at the AS. However, every measurement operator requires an interaction with the CSP as it requires (a) decryption of the answer, and (b) a check that the the privacy budget is not exceeded. These two functionalities are achieved by the Decryption and Privacy Engine modules of the CSP. The Setup and Data Collection phases occur just once at the very beginning, every subsequent program is handled via the corresponding Program Execution phase. We next detail the roles of the different modules in the data owners, the Analytics Server and the Cryptographic Service Provider.
Outis Modules
Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) (1) Key Manager -The foremost duty of the CSP is to initialize the encryption scheme of Outis. This 
is relevant to the program at hand V -represents a vector c -represents a scalar P -represents a set task is handled by the Key Manager module which generates the key pair (sk, pk) for the labHE scheme. It stores the secret key, sk with itself and releases the public key, pk. Note that since the CSP has exclusive access to the secret key sk, it is the only entity capable of decryption in Outis.
(2) Data Decryption -The CSP being the only entity capable of decryption, any measurement of the data (even noisy) has to involve the CSP. The Data Decryption module is tasked with handling all such interactions with the AS. (3) Privacy Engine -Outis starts of with a total privacy budget of B which is unanimously agreed upon by all the data owners. Note that the mechanism of deciding B should be piloted by social prerogatives [42, 49] and is currently outside the scope of Outis. For executing any program, the AS has to interact with the CSP at least once (for decrypting the noisy answer) thereby giving the CSP the opportunity to monitor the AS's actions in terms of privacy budget expenditure. The Privacy Engine module hence maintains a public ledger that records the privacy budget spent in executing each program. Once the privacy cost incurred reaches B , the CSP refuses to decrypt any further answers thereby ensuring that the privacy budget is not exceeded. The ledger is completely public allowing any data owner to verify it as and when desired. (2) Data Encryption -The Data Encryption module stores the public key pk of the labHE scheme used in Outis which is announced by the CSP. This key is used for an element-wise encryption of the data owner's record of per attribute one-hot-codings. In our aforementioned example, we get 
where Enc(i) = labEnc pk (i), i ∈ {0, 1}. Finally the data owner sends this encrypted record to the AS via a secure channel. This is the only interaction that a data owner ever participates in, all the program executions are carried out by the AS and the CSP with the data owners being completely off line.
Analytics Server (AS)
(1) Aggregator -The Aggregator collects the encrypted recordsD i from each of the data owners DO i and collates them into a single encrypted databaseD.
(2) Program Executor -The Program Executor is the most important module of the AS and is tasked with the execution of Outis programs. It takes as input a logical Outis program from an external data analyst, alongside the appropriate privacy parameter and publishes the differentially private output computed with the assistance of the CSP. Outis programs can access the sensitive data using one of 9 primitives that are broadly classified into two types -transformation primitives and measurement primitives. Transformation primitives allow certain modifications on the encrypted data and are performed almost entirely by the AS. The measurement primitives on the other hand reveal some noisy measurement of the data and requires interaction with the CSP. Outis supports two types of measurement primitives that implement two of the most popular differentially private mechanisms, Laplace mechanism [26] and Noisy-Max [26] . A typical Outis program execution consists of a series of transformation on the encrypted data followed by a measurement primitive. Outis programs can also involve programming constructs like loops and conditionals, and permit arbitrary post-processing over the public outputs of the measurement primitives.
Trust Model
We assume that the servers AS and CSP are semi-honest, i.e., they follow the protocol honestly, but their contents and computations can be observed by an adversary. Thus from the data owners perspective the trust assumption is similar to that of LDP; the data owners need not place their trust in any external entity. However there are two modest differences in the Outis setting from the LDP setting.
• We assume that the AS and the CSP are non-colluding and follow the honest-but-curious (or semi-honest) adversary model. We also assume that each data owner has a private channel with the AS. This is to prevent any third party (including the CSP) from eavesdropping.
• The adversary is now reduced to a computationally bounded one as opposed to the information theoretic one in LDP. Table 2 summarizes the differences between different DP models.
Outis Design Principles
The design of Outis is guided by the following principles.
Expressibility: Outis is designed to ensure that state-of-the-art DP programs can be executed on sensitive data by the AS. This necessitates adding noise to functions computed on the entire database (like in CDP), and not just to individual records (like in LDP). In principle, any function can be computed on encrypted data via secure computation, and thus Outis can support any differentially private algorithm. However, we currently limit the expressibility of the programs supported in Outis to those that operate on the sensitive data with efficiently implementable primitives, and whose privacy can be easily tracked by the CSP. Nevertheless, as shown later in the paper, Outis can already support a variety of state-of-the-art DP programs that provide orders of magnitude higher error than their LDP counterparts. The separation between LDP and Outis is discussed further in Appendix D.2.
Minimal trust assumptions:
The only assumptions we make are that adversaries are computationally bounded and that the AS and CSP do not collude. The former allows us to use cryptographic tools, and is in tune with a growing line of work that seeks to address the trust assumptions of CDP via assistance from cryptographic techniques [12, 20, 29, 67, 18, 5, 66] . The latter assumption of non-colluding servers is a popular model for privacy preserving computations [60, 59, 33, 48, 56, 34, 32] .
Data owners are offline: Outis's goal is to mimic the CDP model with untrusted centralized servers. Hence, it is designed so that the data owners are offline once they submit their encrypted records to the AS. This beneficial as the AS does not need to maintain communication channels with the data owners over a long period of time. If the data owners were online, some of our algorithms can be made more efficient as some of the computation from the AS and CSP can be offloaded to the data owners.
Low burden on CSP: Outis views the AS as an extension of the analyst, and that it has a vested interest in obtaining the result of the computation. Thus in Outis, we require the AS to shoulder the major chunk of the workload for any Outis program execution; interactions with the CSP should be minimal and only related to data decryption. Hence we design the AS to perform most of the data transformations by itself (Table 5) . It is interesting to note that we could have had an alternative implementation for Outis where the private database is equally shared between the two servers and they engage in a secret share based secure computation protocol for computing the differentially private answers [15, 23, 9] . However, this would require both the servers to do almost equal amount of work for every program. Such an arrangement would be justified only if both the servers are equally invested in learning the differentially private statistics and is ill-suited for Outis. Additionally, a secret-share based computation would be much more communication intensive resulting in a performance hit.
Outis Primitives
Given a database schema A 1 , . . . , A y and an encrypted instance of this database,D, Outis permits data analysts to author logical Outis programs onD with differential privacy guarantee. The logical programs mainly consist of data transformation operators inspired by relational algebra and differentially private measurement operators. These programs can have constructs like looping and conditionals, and can arbitrarily post-process outputs of measurement operators. Outis compiles these logical programs into Outis protocols that can work on the encrypted data on the AS and CSP. Though these logical Outis programs are designed to run on encrypted data, when operating them on plaintext data, they give differential privacy under CDP.
In this section, we define the primitives for data transformations and differentially private measures (summarized in Table 3 ). Then, we illustrate how to write logical programs using these primitives to express state-of-the art DP algorithms under the CDP model. In Section 5 we describe how Outis compiles these down to protocols that work on encrypted data.
Transformation Primitives
Transformation primitives take an encrypted data as input and output a transformed encrypted data. These primitives thus work completely on the encrypted data and do not expend any privacy budget. Three types of data are considered in this context: (1) an encrypted table of x rows and y columns/attributes, denoted byT , where each attribute value is represented by encrypted one-hot-encoding of the value; (2) an encrypted vector of numbers, denoted by V ; and (3) an encrypted scalar, denoted by c. In addition, every encrypted tableT of x rows has a encrypted bit vector B of size x to indicate whether the record is relevant to the program at hand. If the i-th bit value of B is 1, then the i-th row inT will be used for answering the current program and vice versa. The input to the very first transformation primitive in Outis program is the encrypted databaseD with all bits of B set to be 1. For brevity, we just useT to represent both the encrypted tableT and B. The transformation primitives are detailed below.
(1) CrossProduct × (Ai,Aj )→A (T ): This primitive transforms the two encrypted one-hot-encodings for attributes A i and A j inT into a single encrypted one-hot-encoding of a new attribute A . The domain of the new attribute A is the cross product of the domains for A i and A j . The resulting tableT has one column less thanT . Thus, the construction of the one-hot-coding of the entire y-dimensional domain can be computed by repeated application of this primitive. inT does not satisfy the filtering condition φ, the corresponding r th bit in B will be set to labEnc pk (0); otherwise, the corresponding bit value in B is kept unchanged. Thus the Filter transformation suppresses all the records that are extraneous to answering the program at hand (i.e., does not satisfy φ) by explicitly zeroing the corresponding indicator bits and outputs the tableT with the updated indicator vector.
(4) Count count(T ): This primitive simply counts the number of rows inT that are pertinent to the program at hand, i.e. the number of 1s in its associated bit vector B. This primitive outputs an encrypted scalar c.
The GroupByCount* primitive buckets the input tableT into groups of records having the same value for an attribute A. The output of this transformation is an encrypted vector V that counts the number of unfiltered rows for each value of A. This primitive serves as a preceding transformation for other Outis primitives such as NoisyMax, CountDistinct.
This primitive is similar to GroupByCount*. The only difference between the two is that, GroupByCount outputs a new table that has two columns -the first column corresponds to A and the second columns corresponds to the number of rows for every value of A (in one-hot encoding). This primitive is useful for expressing computations of the form "count the number of age values having at least 100 records" (see program 7 in Table 4 ).
As mentioned above, this primitive is always preceded by a GroupByCount* primitive. Hence the input vector V is an encrypted histogram for some attribute A and this primitive returns the number of distinct values of A that appear inD by counting the non-zero entries of V .
Measurement Primitives
The measurement primitives take encrypted vector of counts V (or a single count c) as input and return noisy measurements on it in the clear. These two primitives correspond to two classic differentially private mechanisms: Laplace mechanism and Noisy-Max mechanism [26] . Both mechanisms add noise η drawn from Table 3 have a stability of 1, except for GroupByCount and GroupByCount* which are 2-stable. Given and ∆T , we define the two measurement primitives as follows.
(1) Laplace Lap ,∆ (V/c): This primitive implements the classic Laplace mechanism [26] . Given an encrypted vector V or an encrypted scalar c, a privacy parameter and sensitivity ∆ of the preceding transformations, the primitive add sufficiently amount of noise to V or c to ensure -differential privacy when data analyst views the plaintext answer.
(2) NoisyMax N oisyM ax ,∆ (V): Noisy-Max is a type of differentially private selection mechanism [26] where the goal is to determine the query with the highest value out of n different noisy query outputs. The algorithm works as follows. First, generate each of the n answers and then add independent Laplace noise from the Laplace distribution Lap( ∆ ) to each of them. The indices with the highest noisy value,P is reported as the desired answer.
Program Examples
A Outis program is a sequence of transformation primitives followed by a measurement primitive and arbitrary post-processing. Consider a database schema Age, Gender, N ativeCountry, Salary . We show 7 Outis program examples in Table 4 over this database.
We will use P1 in Table 4 to illustrate how a Outis program can be written and analyzed. Program P1 aims to compute the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of attribute Age with domain [1, 100]. The first step is to compute 100 range queries, where the i-th query computes the the number of records inD having Age ∈ [1, i] with privacy budget i . The sequence of transformation primitives for each range query is count(σ Age∈[1,i] (π Age (D))). All these three primitives have a stability of 1 and hence by Theorem 3 the resulted range query has a sensitivity upper bounded by the product of these stability values, 1. Thus, the subsequent measurement primitive Laplace for the i-th range query takes in the privacy budget i and sensitivity ∆ = 1 and outputs a noisy plaintext countĉ i . These steps incurs a privacy loss of
by Theorem 1.
After looping over the 100 ranges, P1 obtains a noisy plaintext outputV = [ĉ 1 , ...,ĉ 100 ] and applies a postprocessing step, denoted by post c.d.f (V ). This operator input a noisy histogramV for an attribute A and computes its c.d.fV = [ĉ 1 , ...,ĉ 100 ] via isotonic regression minV V −V 2 s.t. 0 ≤ĉ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ĉ 100 ≤ |D|. By Theorem 2, this step does not amount to any privacy loss. Hence, the entire P1 is -DP, where = 100 i=1 i .
Implementation
In this section we describe the implementation of Outis. First we discuss our proposed technique for extending the labM ult operation of labHE to support n > 2 multiplicands. Then we describe the implementations of Outis primitive. Based on these implementations, Outis can compile a logical program written by the data analyst into a protocol run by the AS and CSP on the encrypted data. Note that all the post-processing on 
General n-way Multiplication for labHE
In addition to the operations supported by an LHE scheme, labHE supports multiplication of two labHE ciphers.
•
However, these algorithms cannot be used directly for a n-way muplication where n > 2. It is so because the "multiplication" cipher e = labM ult(c 1 , c 2 ) does not have a corresponding label, i.e., it is not in the correct labHE cipher representation. Hence we propose Algorithm 1 to generate a label τ and a seed b for every intermediary product of two multiplicands so that it we can do a generic n-way multiplication on the ciphers. Note that the mask r protects the value of (m 1 · m 2 ) from the CSP (Step 3) and b hides (m 1 · m 2 ) from the AS (Step 6). For example, suppose we want to multiply the respective ciphers of 4 messages {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 } ∈ M 4 and obtain e = labEnc pk (m 1 · m 2 · m 3 · m 4 ). For this, the AS first generates e 1,2 = labEnc pk (m 1 · m 2 ) and e 3,4 = labEnc pk (m 3 · m 4 ) using Algorithm 1. Both operations can be done in parallel in just one interaction round between the AS and the CSP. In the next round, the AS can again use Algorithm 1 with inputs e 1,2 and e 3,4 to obtain the final answer e. Thus for a generic n − way multiplication the order of multiplication can be, in fact, parallelized as shown in Figure 2 to require a total of log n rounds of communication with the CSP.
Algorithm 1 genLabM ult -generate label for labM ult
Input: c1 = (a1, d1) = labEnc pk (m1) and c2 = labEnc pk (m2) where a1 = m1 − b1, d1 = Enc pk (b1), a2 = m2 − b2, d2 = Enc pk (b2) Output: e = labEnc pk (m1 · m2) AS: 1: Computes e = labM ult(c1, c2) ⊕ Enc pk (r) where r is a random mask //e corresponds to m1 · m2 − b1 · b2 + r 2: Sends e , d1, d2 to CSP CSP:
//e corresponds to m1 · m2 + r 4: Picks a seed σ and label τ and computes b = F(σ , τ ) 
Primitive Implementation
We now briefly summarize how Outis primitives are compiled into protocols that the AS and CSP can run on encrypted data records. Full details are presented in Appendix B.1.
Project πĀ(·):
The implementation of this primitive simply drops off all but the attributes inĀ from the input tableT and returns the truncated tableT .
Filter σ φ (·): Let φ be a predicate on a single attribute of the form r.A j ∈ V Aj . Row i satisfies the filter if one of the bits corresponding to positions in V Aj are set to 1. Thus the filter bit corresponding to row i is set to:
. Multi-attribute filter implementation is described in Appendix B.1. CrossProduct × Ai,Aj →A (·): The crossproduct between two attributes are computed using genLabM ult() described above.
Count count(·): To evaluate this primitive on its input tableT , Outis simply adds up the bits in the corresponding B, i.e., CountDistinct count * (·): This primitive can be implemented using GroupByCount followed by a Filter. We present an optimized implementation in the appendix.
Laplace Lap ,∆ (V): Recall that both AS and CSP have to add Laplace noise to the output in Outis. Hence the Laplace primitive has two phases. In the first phase, the AS adds an instance of encrypted Laplace noise η 1 ∼ Lap( ∆ ) to the encrypted input to generateV. This acts as the input to the second phase which is executed by the CSP. Here the CSP decryptsV and adds a second instance of the Laplace noise η 2 ∼ Lap( ∆ )
to generate the final noisy outputV in the clear. The Laplace primitive with an encrypted scalar c as the input is implemented in a similar way.
NoisyMax N oisyM ax ,∆ (·): This primitive is implemented using two-party computation between AS and CSP using garbled circuits. The input to this primitive is an encrypted vector of counts V . Similar to Laplace primitive, both AS and CSP are involved. First, the AS adds to V an encrypted Laplace noise vector and a mask M , i.e., for
, where η i ∼ Lap(∆/ ). This encrypted noisy, masked vectorV is then sent to the CSP. Next, the CSP decryptsV using the secret key, i.e.,
The CSP generates a garbled circuit which takes (i) the noisy, masked vectorV from the CSP, and (ii) the mask M from the AS as the input. This circuit will remove the mask fromV to get the noisy countsV and find the index of the top value inV .
Classification of Outis Programs
Outis programs can be grouped into three classes based on the number and type of interaction between the AS and the CSP.
Class I : Single Decrypt Interaction Programs
Recall that the transformation primitives output encrypted data. Since the CSP has exclusive access to the secret key, it is the only party in Outis capable of decryption. Thus for releasing any result (albeit noisy) in the clear, the AS needs to interact at least once with the CSP. Outis supports this type of interactions via the two measurement primitives. Some Outis programs require only a single interaction of this type at the very end to release the noisy output. All other transformations can be performed by the AS via homomorphic operations on the encrypted data records. Typically these programs filter the database on a single attribute. Examples of this type of programs are P1, P2 and P3 from Table 4 . The post-processing step in P1 is done in the clear and hence requires no more interactions with the CSP.
Class II : LabHE Multiplication Interaction Programs
Recall that labHE allows multiplication of two ciphers. Outis can support a general n-way multiplcation of ciphers for n > 2 as described in Section 5.1. However it requires intermediate interactions with the CSP. Thus all Outis programs that require multiplication of more than two ciphers need interaction with the CSP. All programs that filter the database on more than three attributes would thus fall under this class. P4 and P5 from Table 4 are in this class.
Class III : Other Interaction Programs
The GroupBy primitive requires an intermediate interaction with the CSP (for generating the encrypted one-hot-coding). The CountDistinct primitive also uses a garbled circuit (Appendix B.1) and hence requires interactions with the CSP. This is in addition to the interaction required for decrypting the noisy answer (as explained in Class I above). Therefore, any program with the GroupBy or CountDistinct primitive requires at least two rounds of interaction. P6 and P7 from Table 4 are examples of this class.
Outis Optimizations
In this section we present several optimization techniques used by Outis. These optimizations do not alter the end-to-end privacy guarantees of the system.
Differential Privacy Based Optimizations
These optimizations expend some of the overall privacy budget to build differentially private indexes that can be used to speed up computation on encrypted data.
(1) DP Indexing : This optimization is motivated by the fact that several programs first filter out a large fraction of the rows in the dataset. For instance, the program P5 in Table 4 constructs a histogram over Age and Gender on the subset of data for which N ativeCountry is Mexican. Our filter implementation keeps all the rows (even if they do not satisfy the condition) as the AS has no way to tell if the filter condition is satisfied or not. This results in the subsequent GroupbyCount* being run on the full data instead of on a small subset. If there were an index on N ativeCountry, Outis could run the GroupbyCount* on only the subset of records that have N ativeCountry=Mexican instead of on the entire dataset, but an exact index would leak the true data distribution, violating DP.
Hence, Outis allows a differentially private index be built on a prespecified attribute A on the encrypted databaseD. Let P = (P 1 , . . . , P k ) be a uniform partition on the sorted domain of A such that each partition contains s A k consecutive domain values. First we use a garbled circuit to sortD over A intoD s and additionally output a noisy histogramV on this k partitions,V [i] = j ct A,j + η i where i ∈ [k], j ∈ P i , η i ∼ Lap(1/ A ) and ct A,j denotes the number of records with value j for attribute A. Next the AS computes a noisy c.d.f,Ĉ over the k bins using the noisy counts inV using inference based on isotonic regression [40] . There are two heuristics that can be considered for selecting the indexing attribute A. First, A should be very frequently queried. This is intuitive as this would mean a larger fraction of the queries will benefit from this optimization. Second, if {v 1 , ...v n } ⊂ dom(A) is the set of most frequently queried values for attribute A, then ct A,i , i ∈ [n] << m where ct A,i is the number of records inD having value v i for attribute A. This would ensure that the first selection performed alone on A will filter out majority of the records and reduce the intermediate dataset size to be considered for the subsequent predicate.
For executing a program conditioned as
• Optimized feature -This optimization speeds up the execution time by reducing the number of total records to be processed for the program execution.
• Trade-off -The trade-off is a possible increase in error as the noisy selection of records from the index might miss some of the records that do satisfy the filter condition.
• Privacy Cost -Assuming the index is constructed with a privacy parameter A , a selection of a subset of records using it will result in a A -DP intermediate result. If is the parameter used for the subsequent measurement primitives, then by Theorem 1, the total privacy parameter is A + .
(2) DP Range Tree : Range queries constitute a very popular category of queries for typical databases and range trees are a popular data structure constructed to speed up range query answering. A 1-dimensional range tree for an attribute A is an ordered hierarchical data structure such that the leaf nodes correspond to the individual counts for each possible value of A, while the parent nodes cover a range of values and store the sum of the counts of its children. Hence, if range queries are common, pre-computing noisy range trees is an useful optimization, e.g. building a range tree on Age attribute can be useful for programs P1 and P2 in Table 4 . The sensitivity for such a noisy range tree is log s A where s A is the domain size of the attribute on which the tree is constructed. To answer any arbitrary range query, we need to access at most 2 log s A number of nodes in the range tree. Thus to answer all possible range queries on A, the total squared error accumulated is O(
). In contrast for the naive case, we would have incurred error O( [40] . Hence this range tree optimization not only gives us a huge performance boost but also results in better answer accuracy.
• Optimized Feature -The optimization not only reduces the execution time, but also the expected error when executed over multiple range queries.
• Trade-off -The trade-off for this optimization is the storage cost of the range tree (O(2 · s A )).
• Privacy Cost -If the range tree is constructed with privacy parameter R , then any measurement on it is a post-processing step. Hence, the overall privacy cost is R -DP.
Implementation Based Optimizations
These optimizations work completely on the encrypted data and do not expend any privacy budget. Hence they do not affect the accuracy of the executed programs.
(1) Precomputation : Recall that the data owners DO i send per-attribute encrypted one-hot-codings of their data to the AS. We can use the CrossProduct primitive to generate the one-hot-coding of data across two attributes during program executions. However, this step is very costly due to the intermediate interactions required with the CSP. Hence, an useful optimization can be pre-computing the one-hot-coding for the data across a set of popular attributesĀ so that during subsequent program executions, the AS can get the desired representation via simple look-ups. For example, this can be useful for P3 in Table 4 .
• Optimized Feature -This optimization improves the execution time of Outis programs. These multiattribute one-hot-encodings can be re-used for all subsequent programs.
• Trade-off -The trade-off for this pre-computation is the storage cost (O(m·sĀ = m· A∈Ā s A )) incurred to store the multi-attribute one-hot-codings forĀ.
• Privacy Cost -Since this computation is carried completely on the encrypted data, we do not expend any privacy budget.
(2) Off-line Processing : In the implementation of GroupByCount primitive, the CSP needs to generate the encrypted one-hot-codings for the masked histogram (Algorithm 2). Note that the one-hot-coding representation for any such count would simply be a vector of (m − 1) ciphertexts for '0', labEnc pk (0) and 1 ciphertext for '1', labEnc pk (1). Thus one useful optimization can be generating these ciphertexts for 0 and 1 in an off-line phase. (This is similar to the idea of off-line generation of Beaver's multiplication triples [10] used in secure multi-party computation.) In this way the encryption time will not be a part of the program execution time, thereby giving us a performance boost.
• Optimized Feature -This optimization results in a reduction in the run time of Outis programs.
• Trade-off -The trade-off for this optimization is the storage cost (O(m · s A )) incurred to store the ciphers for attribute A.
• Privacy Cost -The computation is carried completely on the encrypted data, we do not expend any privacy budget.
Outis Security Sketch
In this section we provide a sketch of the security proof in the semi-honest model. Our proof will follow the well established simulation argument [62] . Let P be a program that is to be run on dataset D with privacy parameter and let P CDP (D, ) denote the random variable (rv) that corresponds to the output of running P on the CDP model. Theorem 4. Let Π be the protocol corresponding to the execution of program P in Outis. The views and outputs of AS and CSP are denoted follows:
There exists Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) simulators Sim 1 and Sim 2 such that:
, and
is the combined output of the two parties The proof of this is presented in Appendix A. The statement of the theorem given above assumes that AS and CSP do not collude with the users (the data owners). However, if AS colludes with a subset of the users, which essentially means Sim 1 (Sim 2 )has to be given the data corresponding to these users as additional parameter. This provides no complications in the proof at all (see the proof in [34] ). Since every program P expressible using Outis primitives satisfies differential privacy, it follows from Theorem 4 that every execution of Outis satisfies computational differential privacy. 
Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe our evaluation of Outis along two dimensions, accuracy and performance of Outis programs. Specifically we address the following questions :
• Q1: Do Outis programs have significantly lower error than that for the corresponding state-of-theart LDP implementations? Additionally is the accuracy of Outis programs comparable to that of the corresponding CDP implementations? • Q2: Do the proposed optimizations provide substantial performance improvement over unoptimized Outis? • Q3: Is the execution time for Outis programs practical and do they scale well?
Evaluation Highlights:
• Outis can achieve upto 2 orders of smaller error than the corresponding LDP implementation on a data of significant size (∼ 30, 00) (Figure 3 ).
• The optimization techniques in Outis can improve the performance of unoptimized Outis by up to 6514× (Table 5 ).
• The performance cost of a large class of Outis programs is less than 5 minutes for a dataset of size ∼ 30, 000 and it scales linearly with the size of the dataset ( Figure 5 ). The AS performs majority of the work for most program executions (Table 5 ).
Methodology
Programs: To answer the aforementioned questions we ran the experiments on the Outis programs previously outlined in Table 3 . Due to space limitations we present the results of only four of them in the main paper namely P1,P3,P5 and P7. The rationale behind choosing these four is that they cover all three classes of programs (section 5.3) and showcase the advantages for all of the four proposed optimizations. Additional experimental results for programs P2,P4 and P6 from Table 4 are presented in Appendix C . Dataset: We ran our experiments on the Adult dataset from the University of California, Irvine repository [2] which has been extracted from the 1994 census data. The dataset is of size 32, 651.
Metrics:
Accuracy: For accuracy the following metrics are used • Programs with scalar outputs, i.e., P5 and P7 use absolute error = |c −ĉ| where c is the true count and c is the noisy output.
• Programs with vector outputs, i.e., P1 and P3 use the L1 error metric given by
For each of the programs, we report the mean and std error values over 10 repetitions. Performance: We report the mean total execution time in seconds for each program, over 10 repetitions. Configuration: We implemented Outis in Python with the garbled circuit implementation of the EMP toolkit [1]. The prototype includes all four optimizations described in section 6. For Adult dataset, Outis constructs a DP index optimization over the attribute N ativeCountry that benefits programs like P4 and P5. Our experiments assign 20% of the total program privacy parameter towards constructing the index and the rest is used for the remaining program execution. Outis also constructs a DP range tree over the attribute Age with the full privacy parameter. This helps programs like P1,P2 and P3. This is our default implementation for Outis. 
End-to-end Accuracy Comparison
In this section we evaluate Q1 by performing a comparative analysis between the empirical accuracy of the aforementioned four Outis programs (both optimized and unoptimized) and that of the corresponding state-of-the-art LDP [70] and CDP [26] implementations with varying privacy parameter ∈ {0.1, ..., 0.9}. The first observation with respect to accuracy is that the mean error for a single frequency count for Outis is at least 2 orders less than that of the corresponding LDP implementation. For example, Figure 3a shows that for P1 (c.d.f on Age), the mean error for Outis for = 0.1 is given by 0.060 while the corresponding LDP implementation has an error of 9.2. Similarly for P3 (Figure 3b ), = 0.1 results in a mean error of 5862.4 as compared to an error of 576478.2 for the corresponding LDP implementation. P5 (Figure 3c) gives a mean error of only 15.8 for = 0.1. In contrast, the corresponding LDP implementation has an error of 3199.96. The accuracy improvement on P7 (Figure 3d ) by Outis is less significant as compared to the other programs, because P7 outputs the number of age values ([1-100]) having at least 100 records. At = 0.1, at least 40 age values out of 100 are reported incorrectly on whether their counts pass the threshold. Outis reduces the error by half.
For P1 (Figure 3a) , we observe that the error of Outis is around an order less than that of the unoptimized implementation. For instance, the mean error for Outis is 20× lower than that of unoptimized Outis for = 0.1. The reason is that, P1 constructs the c.d.f over the attribute Age (with domain size 100) by first executing 100 range queries. Thus, if the total privacy budget for the program is , then for unoptimized Outis, each query gets a privacy parameter of just 100 . In contrast, the DP range tree is constructed with the full budget and sensitivity log 100 thereby resulting in lesser error. For P5 (Figure 3c ) however, the unoptimized implementation has slightly better accuracy (around 2×) than Outis. It is because of two reasons; firstly the noisy index on N ativeCountry might miss some of the rows satisfying the filter condition (N ativeCountry=Mexico). Secondly, since only 0.8% of the total privacy parameter is budgeted for the Laplace primitive in the optimized program execution, this results in a higher error as compared to that of unoptimized Outis. However, this is a small cost to pay for achieving a performance gain of 41×. The optimizations for P3 (Figure 3b ) and P7 (Figure 3d ) work completely on the encrypted data and do not expend the privacy budget. Hence they do not hurt the program accuracy in any way.
Another observation from Figure 3 is that the error of Outis is around 2× higher than that of the corresponding CDP implementation. This conforms with our expectation as we add two instances of Laplace noise in Outis. For instance, Outis's error for programs 4 (Figure 3b ), 6 ( Figure 3c ) and 8 ( Figure 3d ) is respectively 1.49×, 1.69× and 2.1× higher than that of the corresponding CDP implementation for = 0.1. For P1 however Outis has at least 15× lower error than that of the CDP implementation due to the DP range tree optimization as explained in the preceding paragraph.
Performance Gain Due to Optimizations
In this section we evaluate Q2 by analysing how much speed-up is brought about by the proposed optimizations in the total program execution. The results are reported in Table 5 . DP Range Tree : For P1 we see that the total time taken for execution for the unoptimized Outis implementation is about half an hour. However, using the range tree optimization reduces the execution time by 5667×. The reason behind this huge speed-up is that the time required by the AS in the optimized implementation becomes almost negligible because it simply needs to do a memory fetch to read off the answer from the pre-computed range tree instead of computing it from the entire encrypted database. DP Index : For P5, we observe that the unoptimized implementation takes around 20 minutes to run. However a DP index over the attribute N ativeCountry reduces the execution time to about 30s giving us a 41× speed-up. It is so because, only about 2% of the data records satisfy N ativeCountry=Mexico. Thus the index reduces the number of records to be considered for the program execution drastically thereby resulting in a huge performance boost. Let ρ represent the fraction of the privacy parameter used towards constructing the DP index. In Figure  4 we study how the mean execution time and the error of the final result vary as a function of ρ for P5 for a total privacy parameter of = 1.1. From Figure 4a we observe that the mean error incurred drops sharply from ρ = 0.1 to ρ = 0.2, stabilises till ρ = 0.5 and starts increasing again. This is so because, at ρ = 0.2, the noisy index correctly identifies almost all the records satisfying the Filter condition and hence does not contribute much to the total error. However as we keep increasing ρ, the amount of privacy budget left for the Laplace primitive keeps decreasing which results in higher error. From Figure 4b , we observe that the execution time increases till ρ = 0.5 and then stabilizes. The reason behind this is that, the total number of records returned after ρ = 0.5 does not differ by much. Thus from the two figures we observe that for ρ = 0.2 we get a high speed up (40×) with relatively low error (3). Hence we choose ρ = 0.2 for our experiments. A formal accuracy vs speed up trade-off analysis would be very helpful in this regard and is part of our future plan.
Pre-computation : For P3 the unoptimized execution time on the dataset of 32561 records is around 2 days. This is so because the CrossProduct primitive used in the program needs to perform 200·32561 labM ult operations which is very time consuming. Hence from Table 5 we see that, pre-computing the 2-D attribute over Age and Gender is a very useful optimization as now the execution reduces to just about 5 minutes giving us a 596.86× speed up.
Off-line Processing : The most costly primitive for P7 is the GroupByCount primitive since the CSP has to generate 3256200 ciphertexts of 0 and 1 for the encrypted one-hot-codings. This results in a total execution time of about 8.5 hours in unoptimized Outis. However, by generating the ciphertexts off-line, the execution time can be reduced to just 5 minutes giving us a speed up of 102.49×. Another important observation from Table 5 is that the AS performs the major chunk of the work for most program executions. This conforms with our discussion in Section 3.4.
Scalability
In this section we evaluate Q3 by observing the execution times of the aforementioned four Outis programs and studying how well the programs scale ( Figure 5 ). All the reported execution times are for optimized implementations. For P1 we see that the the execution time remains unchanged with increase in the dataset size. This is so because once the range tree is constructed, irrespective of the dataset size, the program execution just involves reading the answer directly from the nodes of the tree followed by a decryption by the CSP. The execution time for the optimized P3 is dominated by the cost of the ⊕ operation for the GroupBy primitive which scales linearly with the number of data records. Hence, as shown in Figure 5 , the execution time for P3 increases linearly with the dataset size. For P5, the execution time basically depends on the % of the records in the dataset that satisfy the condition N ativeCountry = M exico (as this is roughly the number of records that will be retrieved from the noisy index). For the optimized execution of P7 as well, the time is dominated by the ⊕ operation for the GroupBy primitive, thereby scaling linearly with the dataset size.
9 Related Work
Differential Privacy
Introduced by Dwork et al. [26] , differential privacy has enjoyed immense attention from both academia and industry in the last decade. We will discuss the recent directions in two models of differential privacy: the centralized differential privacy (CDP), and local differential privacy (LDP). The CDP model assumes the presence of a trusted server which can aggregate all users' data before perturb the query answers. This allows the design of a complex algorithm that releases more accurate query answers than the basic DP mechanisms. For example, an important line of work in the CDP model has been towards proposing "derived" mechanisms" [19] or "revised algorithms" [13] from basic DP mechanisms (like exponential mechanism, Laplace mechanism, etc.). The design of these mechanisms leverages on specific properties of the query and the data, resulting in a better utility than the basic mechanisms. One such technique is based on data partition and aggregation [81, 40, 64, 4, 22, 76, 63, 75] and is helpful in answering histogram queries. The privacy guarantees of these mechanisms can be ensured via the composition theorems and the post-processing property of differential privacy [26] . Other recent work include [74, 79, 78, 39, 50, 27, 61, 52, 24, 38] . In the future, we would like to extend Outis to support many of these algorithms.
The LDP was first introduced by Kasiviswanathan et al. [44] . Randomized response proposed by Warner in 1960s [73] is one of the simplest LDP techniques. The recent LDP research techniques [70, 7, 30] focus on constructing a frequency oracle that estimates the frequency of any value in the domain. However, when the domain size is large, it might be computationally infeasible to construct the histogram over the entire domain. To tackle this challenge, specialized and efficient algorithms have been proposed to compute heavy hitters [71, 31, 7] , frequent itemsets [65, 72] , and marginal tables [21, 82] . As the LDP model does not require a trusted data curator, it enjoyed significant industrial adoption, such as Google [30, 31] , Apple [37] , and Samsung [58] .
Recently it has been showed that augmenting randomized response mechanism with an additional layer of anonymity in the communication channel can improve the privacy guarantees. The first work to study this was PROCHLO [12] implementation by Google. PROCHLO necessitates this intermediary to be trusted, this is implemented via trusted hardware enclaves (Intel's SGX). However, as showcased by recent attacks [68] , it is notoriously difficult to design a truly secure hardware in practice. Motivated by PROCHLO, the authors in [29] , present a tight upper-bound on the worst-case privacy loss. Formally, they show that any permutation invariant algorithm satisfying -LDP will satisfy O(
n , δ)-CDP, where n is the data size.
Cheu et al. [20] demonstrate privacy amplification by the same factor for 1-bit randomized response by using a mixnet architecture to provide the anonymity. This work also proves another important result that the power of the mixnet model lies strictly between those of the central and local models.
A parallel line of work involves efficient use of cryptographic primitives for differentially private functionalities. Agarwal et al. [5] proposed an algorithm for computing histogram over encrypted data. Rastogi et al. [66] and Shi et al. [67] proposed algorithms that allow an untrusted aggregator to periodically estimate the sum of n users' values in a privacy preserving fashion.However, both schemes are irresilient to user failures. Chan et al. [18] tackled this issue by constructing binary interval trees over the users.
Two-Server Model
The two-server model is a popular choice for privacy preserving machine learning techniques. Researchers have proposed privacy preserving ridge regression systems with the help of a cryptographic service provider [60, 34, 32, 33] . While the authors in [33] use a hybrid multi-party computation scheme with a secure inner product technique, Nikolaenko et al. propose a hybrid approach in [60] by combining homomorphic encryptions and Yao's garbled circuits. Gascon et al. [32] extended the results in [60] to include vertically partitioned data and the authors in [34] solve the problem using just linear homomorphic encryption. Zhang et al. in [56] also propose secure machine learning protocols using a privacy-preserving stochastic gradient descent method. Their main contribution includes developing efficient algorithms for secure arithmetic operations on shared decimal numbers and proposing alternatives to non-linear functions such as sigmoid and softmax tailored for MPC computations. In [59] and [48] the authors solve the problem of privacy-preserving matrix factorization. In both the papers, use a hybrid approach combining homomorphic encryptions and Yao's garbled circuits for their solutions.
Homomorphic Encryption
With improvements made in implementation efficiency and new constructions developed in the recent past, there has been a surge in practical privacy preserving solutions employing homomorphic encryptions. A lot of the aforementioned two-server models employ homomorphic encryption [60, 59, 34, 48] . In [41, 36, 16] the authors enable neural networks to be applied to homomorphic-ally encrypted data. Linear homomorphic encryption is used in [35] to enable privacy-preserving machine learning for ensemble methods while uses fullyhomomorphic encryption to approximate the coefficients of a logistic-regression model. [14] uses somewhathomomorphic encryption scheme to compute the forecast prediction of consumer usage for smart grids.
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a new implementation model for differential privacy that achieves the constant error bound and algorithmic expressibility of CDP without the need for any trusted party. This is achieved via two non-colluding servers with the assistance of cryptographic primitives specifically LHE and garbled circuits. Our proposed system Outis can execute a rich class of programs that can run efficiently by virtue of four optimizations.
One possible future work can be to support a larger class of programs in Outis. For e.g., extension of the current functionality of Outis to include aggregation operators such as sum, median, average etc should be easily achievable. Supporting multi-table queries like joins in Outis based on existing works along the lines of elastic sensitivity [43] etc would also be an useful extension. Yet another interesting direction can be enabling learning algorithms on Outis. Comparatively simpler algorithms like linear regression can based on a previous work [34] which also uses LHE and a two-server model. For this, we need to extend Outis with a new primitive that performs matrix multiplications. For more involved models like deep learning, we might need to combine the differential privacy results of [3] with the homomorphic encryption techniques of CryptoNet [36] . Recall that currently the data analyst spells out the explicit Outis program (i.e., the sequence of Outis primitives and their arguments) to the AS. Thus another interesting future work can be constructing a compiler that takes as input only a user specified query in a high-level-language and a total privacy budget for the query. The compiler should then be able to formalize an optimized Outis program expressed in terms of Outis primitives with automated sensitivity analysis and subsequent optimal per measurement primitive privacy budget allocation. As mentioned in section 3.6, an alternative implementation for Outis can be based on secret shares modulo the assumption that both the servers are benefit from learning the differential privacy output. Hence another useful extension might be re-implementing Outis with secret share based schemes. For this, the functionality of the existing primitives would mostly be the same, only the respective implementations will change. Yet another extension can be removing the second server (CSP) altogether and instead capturing its functionalities within a trusted execution environment (TEE).
• All other primitives except Laplace essentially use homomorphic properties of our encryption scheme and thus there security follows from semantic-security of these scheme.
• The proof for the Laplace primitive is given below.
The proof for an entire program P (which is a composition of these primitives) follows from the composition theorem [62, Section 7.3 .1] We will prove the theorem for the Laplace primitive. In this case the views are as follows (the outputs of the two parties can simply computed from the views):
The random variables η 1 and η 2 are random variables generated according to the Laplace distribution with the requisite parameters. The simulators Sim 1 (z 1 ) (where z 1 is the random variable distributed P CDP (D, ))) performs the following steps:
• Generates a pair of keys (pk 1 , sk 1 ) for the encryption scheme and generates random data set D 1 of the same size as D and encrypts it using pk 1 to getD 1 .
• Generates η 1 according to the Laplace distribution.
The output of
Recall that the view of the AS is (D, η 1 , P (D) + η 2 + η 1 ). The computational indistinguishability ofD 1 andD follows from the semantic security of the encryption scheme. The tuple (η 1 , z 1 + η 1 ) has the same distribution as (η 1 , P (D) + η 2 + η 1 ) and hence the tuples are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, Sim 1 (z 1 ) is computational indistingushable from V iew Π 1 (P, D, ). The simulators Sim 2 (z 2 ) (where z 2 is the random variable distributed according to P CDP (D, ))) performs the following steps:
• Generates a pair of keys (pk 2 , sk 2 ) for our encryption scheme.
• Generates η 2 according to the Laplace distribution.
The output of Sim 2 (z 2 ) is (η 2 , labEnc pk (z 2 )+η 2 ). By similar argument as before Sim 2 (z 2 ) is computationally indistinguishable from V iew 
B Additional Implementation Details
B.1 Primitive Implementation
CrossProduct × Ai,Aj →A (·): This primitive replaces the two attributes A i and A j by a single attribute A . Given the encrypted input tableT , where all attributes are in one-hot-encoding and encrypted, the attributes ofT except A i and A j remain the same. For every row inT , we denote the encrypted one-hot-encoding for A i and A j byṽ 1 andṽ 2 . Let s 1 and s 2 be the domain sizes of A i and A j respectively. Then the new one-hot-encoding for A , denoted byṽ, has a length of s = s 1 · s 2 . For l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}, we havẽ
Only one bit inṽ for A will be encrypted 1 and the others will be encrypted 0s. When merging more than two attributes, Outis can use the genLabM ult() described in Section 5.1 to speed up computation.
Project πĀ(·): The implementation of this primitive is presented in the main paper in sec 5.2.
Filter σ φ (·): The predicate φ in this primitive is a conjunction of range conditions overĀ, defined as: for a row r in input tableT , φ(r) = Aj ∈Ā (r.A j ∈ V Aj ), where r.A j is the value of attribute A j in row r and V Aj ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , s Aj } (the indices for attribute values of A j with domain size s Aj ). AS: 7: Rotates every entry by its corresponding mask value to obtain the desired encrypted one-hot-codingṼ [i].
First, we will show how to evaluate whether a row r satisfies r.A j ∈ V Aj . Letṽ j be the encrypted one-hot-encoding of A j , then the indicator function can be computed as
If the attribute of A j in r has a value in V Aj , then I r.Aj ∈V A j equals 1; otherwise, 0.
Next, we can multiply all the indicators using genLabM ult() (Section 5.1) to check whether all attributes in A j ∈Ā of r satisfy the conditions in φ. LetĀ = {A 1 , . . . , A m }, then φ(r) = genLabM ult(I A1∈V A 1 , . . . , I Am∈V Am ).
Last, we update the bit of r in B, i.e., B [i] = labM ult(B[i], φ(r)), given r is the ith row in the input table. This step zeros out some additional records which were found to be extraneous by some preceding filter conditions.
Note that when the Filter transformation is applied for the very first time in a Outis program and the input predicate is conditioned on a single attribute A ∈ V A , we can directly compute the new bit vector using I r.A∈V A , i.e., for the ith record r in input tableT , we have B CountDistinct count * (·): The implementation of this primitive involves both AS and CSP. Given the input encrypted vector of counts V of length s, the AS first masks V to form a new encrypted vector V with a vector of random numbers M , i.e., for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1},
. This masked encrypted vector is then sent to CSP and decrypted by CSP to a plaintext vector V using the secret key.
Next, CSP generates a garbled circuit which takes (i) the mask M from the AS, and (ii) the plaintext masked vector V and a random number r from the CSP as the input. This circuit first removes the mask M from V to get V and then counts the number of non-zero entries in V , denoted by c. A masked count c = c+r is outputted by this circuit. CSP send both the circuit and the encrypted random number labEnc pk (r) to AS.
Last, the AS evaluates this circuit to the masked count c and obtains the final output to this primitive: c = labEnc pk (c ) − labEnc pk (r).
Laplace Lap ,∆ (V): The implementation of this primitive is presented in the main paper in section 5.2.
NoisyMax N oisyM ax ,∆ (·): The implementation of this primitive is presented in section 5.2.
B.2 DP Index Optimization Implementation
The DP index optimization can be implemented via a garbled circuit which aims to compute two pieces of information: a sorted encrypted database based on A and a -differentially private index on A. This circuit takes (i) the secret key sk from the CSP, and (ii) the entire databaseD and the attribute A from the AS. The attribute A has a domain of size s A and is uniformly partitioned into k ranges {R 1 , . . . , R i , . . . , R s A /k }, where + 1) ). This circuit first decryptsD using the secret key and sorts the decrypted database on attribute A in ascending order. The sorted database is then encrypted again. Then the circuit computes a histogram V on the k ranges of A, denoted by [c 1 , . . . , c k ] and perturbs each count with Laplace noise, i.e.,ĉ i = c i + η i , where η i ∼ Lap(1/ ). The noisy counts V are then used to construct a cumulative histogram over A, whereĉ df [i] = i j=0ĉ i and post-processed such that they are in non-decreasing order and non-negative, and cdf [k] = |D| [40] .
Given the differentially private cdf and the sorted database, when a program would like to select rows with A ∈ [v i , v j ], we find the ranges that contain v i and v j respectively, denoted by R i and R j . Then we return all records in the sorted database which cover all ranges from R i and R j . This corresponds to row Figure 2 illustrates how a n-way multiplication described in Section 5.1 can be parallelized. This approach requires a total of log n rounds of communication between AS and CSP.
B.3 Illustration genLabMult
C Additional Evaluation
We present additional accuracy study for Outis programs P2, P4, and P6 from Table 4 . Figure 6 shows the empirical accuracy of these three programs (both optimized and unoptimized) and that of the corresponding state-of-the-art LDP [70] and CDP [26] implementations with varying privacy parameter ∈ {0.1, ..., 0.9}. We observe the similar results for P2, P4, and P6 as the other programs (P1, P3, P5, P7 in Figure 3 ). The errors of Outis programs and unoptimized Outis programs are very closed to CDP and are much smaller than that of LDP.
D Discussion
D.1 Joint Laplace Noise Generation
Recall that in Outis, both the servers, AS and CSP have to add two separate instances of Laplace noise to true answer. Thus the expected error incurred in Outis is quantitatively twice that of the traditional Laplace mechanism in traditional CDP model. However, there is an alternative way of jointly computing a single instance of the Laplace noise via a secure multi party computation protocol [57] . For this, the CSP generates a garbled circuit that takes one l-bit random string from CSP and AS each as an input, denoted by S 1 and S 2 respectively. This circuit performsS = S 1 xorS 2 and uses it to generate an instance of random noise, η drawn from the distribution Lap( 1 ) following the fundamental law of transformation of probabilities. Last, the circuit encrypts η and returns η = labEnc pk (η). Hence, this approach adds just one instance of the Laplace noise, resulting the same accuracy guarantee as the CDP model. However owing to the garbled circuit, this implementation is computationally heavier. Therefore, we choose the two phase noise addition implementation for Outis in this paper. 
D.2 Separation from LDP model
As discussed in the introduction, the LDP model is less powerful in query answering than the CDP model [44, 20] . However, by virtue of secure computation, we can potentially implement all the functionalities of the CDP model in our two-server model. However, by virtue of secure computation, we can potentially implement all the functionalities of the CDP model in our two-server model. Functional efficiency might be a point of contention in certain cases, but nothing in the architecture of Outis can restrict its algorithmic expressibility.
Recall that the power of the LDP model is equivalent to that of the statistical query model [46] from learning theory and there exists an exponential separation between the accuracy and sample complexity of local and central algorithms [44] . We will showcase three different queries which can be computed efficiently in Outis but infeasible in the standard LDP model. DNF Queries. The class of DNF queries fall outside the scope of statistical query models [47] . Hence it is infeasible to answer counting queries based on a predicate with a disjunction in the LDP model. However, we can answer them in Outis as follows. Consider a DNF query φ = (A 11 ∧ ... ∧ A 1k ) ∨ ... ∨ (A t1 ∧ ...A tl ), t, k, l ∈ Z ≥0 .
Let Attribute(φ) denote the set of all attributes in A that appear in the boolean condition φ. For example, if φ = (A 1 == v 1 ) ∧ A 2 == v 2 ) ∨ A 3 == v 3 , then we have Attribute(φ) = {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 }. Firstly, the AS computes the attribute setĀ = Attribute(φ) and projectsD onĀ. Then, the AS constructs the encrypted one-hot-coding of over all attributes inĀ using the cross product transformation. We denote the new attribute A and the new tableD . Now, the AS simply filters this new tableD with predicate φ such that φ is the equivalent of φ when expressed in terms of the new attribute A . Finally, AS performs the Count transformation and the Laplace transformation to obtain the final result.
Variable Selection Problem. The variable selection problem is an optimization problem described as follows. Given a set of counting queries, the problem finds the query with nearly the largest value, i.e., computes an approximate argmax. Cheu et al. [20] prove that the sample complexity of this problem in the "one-message" mixnet model (i.e., each user send only a single message into the shuffle) is exponentially larger than that of the CDP model. The variable-selection problem is actually equivalent to the exponential mechanism [26] in the CDP model. Moreover, the exponential mechanism is simply a variant of the "Report Noisy-Max" algorithm with a different noise distribution [6] . Thus essentially, the NoisyMax primitive in Outis is capable of solving the variable-selection problem accurately.
Count Distinct Values. Consider the problem of computing the number of distinct values out of a set of m user data where the domain of the values is S and m << |S|. In the LDP model, for small sizes of S, one can construct a frequency oracle and compute the number of values with non-zero count with some careful thresholding [70] . However, if the size of S is huge then it becomes computationally infeasible to deploy the aforementioned mechanism. For example, if the values correspond to different URLs, since the total domain size is 2 64 , computation limitations make this problem infeasible to be solved in the LDP setting. There are mechanisms that use techniques like dividing the data into groups and then performing specialised processing etc to find top k heavy hitters in this setting [71, 8] but still these work only for low values of k < 60. Although for our discussion in the paper we have considered the one-hot-coding as our preferred data encoding scheme, Outis architecturally can support any arbitrary encoding scheme. For instance, for URLs the data owners can instead use the domain name based encoding (i.e., subdomain.secondleveldomain.topleveldomain) for encrypting their data. Following this, an appropriate garbled circuit to count the number of distinct values from this encrypted dataset (which can be defined as a new Outis primitive) can answer the above query in the Outis setting.
An important point to be noted here is that the power of the shuffler or mixnet model (which is obtained by augmenting LDP with anonymization via shuffling) [12, 20, 29] , lies strictly between that of traditional LDP and CDP. Thus the two-server model of Outis differs from this line of work in three major ways. First, Outis results in no reduction in expressibility as compared to that of the CDP model. Second, the mixnet/shuffler model results in an approximate DP guarantee ( log 1 δ n , δ) which incurs an expected error of O( log 1 δ ). In practice, δ has to be smaller than 1 n in order to get meaningful privacy. In contrast, Outis achieves the same order of accuracy guarantees as that of the CDP model. Finally, the trust assumptions of the shuffler/mixnet model differ from that of Outis. Google's implementation relies on a trusted intermediary shuffler which they implement via trusted hardware enclaves. However truly secure hardware enclaves are notoriously difficult to achieve in practice [68] . The mixnet model on the other hand requires a mix network or mixnet which is a protocol involving several computers that inputs a sequence of encrypted messages, and outputs a uniformly random permutation of those messages' plaintexts. Their trust assumption is that at least one of the servers needs to behave honestly. For Outis, both the servers are completely untrusted under the constraint that they are non-colluding and follow the protocols semi-honestly.
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